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But surely no legal principle not even sovereignty can ever shield crimes 
against humanity…Armed intervention should always remain the option of 




1.1 Background  
At the time this statement was made by the former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, the international community was engulfed in a debate concerning 
humanitarian intervention and its effect on state sovereignty.2 Recent interventions in 
states such as East Timor, Haiti and Kosovo had sparked off concern regarding the 
tension between sovereignty and the recognition of human rights norms which has for 
a long time ‘raged’ within academic institutions and the international community as a 
whole.3 In the rhetoric of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility 
of states to respect human rights within their jurisdictions are often countered with 
claims of sovereign equality and the principle of non-intervention.4
 The concept of sovereignty has provided the fundamental framework for order 
for over three centuries and has greatly influenced the development of international 
law.
 
5 However, because of the tendency of most states to participate or acquiesce in 
human rights violations within their territories, there have been attempts by ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ to change the balance from an emphasis on absolute sovereignty to 
limited sovereignty, which entails responsibility.6
                                                   
1 We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century Report of the Secretary 
General (March 2000) UN Doc A/54/2000 at para 219. Available at 
 The most notable of these attempts 
was made by the International Commission on State Sovereignty (hereinafter the 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000923.pdf. [Accessed 4 February 
2009]. 
2  Gareth Evans ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’ 2004. 
Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2561$1=1 [Accessed 22 January 2009]. 
3 Bruce Cronin ‘The Tension between Sovereignty and Intervention in the prevention of Genocide’ 
2007 Human Rights Review 293 at 299. 
4 Panu Minkkinen ‘The Ethos of Sovereignty: A Critical Appraisal’ 2007 Human Rights Review pg 33 
5 Thomas W McShane ‘International law and the New World Order: Redefining Sovereignty.’ 
Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/04mcshane.pdf 
[Accessed 3 August 20]. 
















1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
 This research examines whether there is sufficient state practice and opinio juris to 
support the position held by most advocates of human rights that as a result of the 
recognition of human rights norms and international humanitarian law, the right of 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect have developed as 
international law norms which override the claims and rights inherent in the 
traditional notions of state sovereignty particularly the principles of non-intervention 
and the prohibition of the use of force in the affairs of other states. That is whether 




1.3 Statement of the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is not to engage in an argument of whether or not sovereignty is 
absolute or limited as there is arguably sufficient evidence to show limitations placed 
on the sovereignty of states by factors such as globalisation, trade, integration and 
environmental issues.9
 By an examination of the existing body of humanitarian interventions 
undertaken since the inception of the United Nations in 1945 particularly with 
respect to Security Council resolutions and with emphasis on the criticisms generated 
by the majority of states whenever interventions were embarked upon and justified 
on grounds of humanitarian intervention, I argue that there is insufficient state 
practice and opinio juris to justify a customary right of humanitarian intervention in 
 The thesis is limited to a consideration of the right of 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect as binding norms, which 
may have developed in international law to place limitations on sovereignty. 
                                                   
7 See generally The Responsibility to Protect: Report and Supplementary Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) International Development Research 
Centre, Canada. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ivan Simonovic ‘Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First Century’ (2001/2002) 25 Hastings 














 In addition, I argue that there is no binding norm of the 
responsibility to protect in international law and consequently, the principle of 
sovereignty as control prevails over sovereignty as responsibility. 
1.4 Literature Review 
There exists an enormous amount of literature on the concept of sovereignty with 
varying views regarding its origin and evolution, its scope and nature. While many 
recognise the existence of change in the meaning of sovereignty there has been great 
disagreement about how to interpret the significance of the change.11 Out of the 
authors reviewed and listed in the bibliography, the report by International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) represents the best effort 
to assemble in a more convenient way the vast amount of literature on sovereignty as 




The research is desk based and studies the primary and secondary sources relevant to 
the concept of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
protect. The primary sources include the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, cases and Security Council Resolutions. The 
secondary sources include books, journal articles, official reports and documents of 
the United Nations and online articles.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
This chapter introduces the thesis as a whole and comprises amongst other things the 
objectives and statement of the thesis. 
                                                   
10 An in depth explanation for this conclusion would be examined in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
11 Thomas J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber ‘The Social Construction of State Sovereignty’ in Thomas 
J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) State Sovereignty as a Social Construct (1996) Biersteker pg 
14. 
12 See generally the Report and Supplementary Report of the ICISS (note 7). Although the report and 
the supplementary volume is cited throughout the research, an in depth discussion of the ICISS and its 












Chapter 2: The Concept of Sovereignty: A general overview. 
This chapter examines the historical development of the concept of sovereignty with 
emphasis on the nature of sovereignty before and after World War II. These eras 
reflect the different attitudes regarding the nature of sovereignty. The pre-World War 
II era, which comprises the period from the inception of the concept in 1648 to the 
period after World War I, represents the traditional notions of sovereignty, which 
emphasises its absolute nature. The post- World War II era represents a period where 
there are conscious attempts to place limitations on sovereignty through the 
development of other norms. This chapter also discusses the principles of non-
intervention and prohibition of the use of force, which enforce the concept of 
sovereignty. 
Chapter 3: Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of a Norm? 
This chapter examines the controversies regarding the right of humanitarian 
intervention. It gives a detailed overview of humanitarian interventions undertaken 
under the auspices of the United Nations and is divided into pre-1990 and post-1990 
humanitarian interventions. These dates are watersheds in the sense that they reflect 
the attitude of states to sovereignty and human rights norms during and after the Cold 
War. The legal and moral justifications proffered for humanitarian interventions 
reflect the earlier attempts made after World War II to modify state sovereignty. 
Finally, it concludes that there is no customary right of humanitarian intervention. 
Chapter 4: Sovereignty as the Responsibility to Protect. 
This chapter examines the idea of the responsibility to protect doctrine as proposed 
by the ICISS. This chapter is restricted to an examination of the responsibility to 
react. This is important because the responsibility to react retains the substantive 
issues inherent in the humanitarian intervention debate. This chapter posits the 
argument that the R2P is not a binding international law norm and as such, 
sovereignty has not been redefined from control to responsibility. 
















THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised 
meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those 
who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to 





The international society is based on a set of normative structures, which were 
derived from factual situations with sovereignty being the foremost among them.14 It 
is regarded as the ‘primary constitutive rule’ of international law, which regulates the 
relationship of states.15 It has for the last several hundred years been a defining 
principle of interstate relations and a foundation of world order.16 It is ascribed to a 
state in terms of territory and population over which institutional authorities exercise 
absolute control free from all external interference.17
The concept of sovereignty has many functions in interstate relationships and 
lays the foundation for other traditional concepts of international law such as 
territorial integrity, sovereign equality and sovereign immunity.
 
18 It is deeply rooted 
in customary international law and is supported by other corollary principles and 
rules of public international law such as the prohibition of the use of force and non-
intervention in domestic affairs.19 According to Hinsley, “sovereignty will not be 
found in societies in which there are no states.”20 Consequently, it provides a basis in 
international law for claims of state actions and its breach is usually invoked as an 
institution that must be both protected and defended.21
                                                   
13 Lassa Oppenheim International Law A Treaties Hersch Lauterpacht (ed) 8th ed (1955) pg 108. 
   
14 Mohammed Ayoob ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (2002) 6 International 
Journal of Human Rights 81 at 82. 
15Biersteker and Webber (note 11) at 1. 
16 The Responsibility to Protect:  Research, Bibliography, Background Supplementary Volume to the 
Report of The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) pg 7. 
17 J Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin ‘The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of 
Sovereignty in International Relations’ (1994) 48 (1) International Organisation 107 at 111. 
18John H Jackson ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ 97 AJIL (2003) pg 
782. 
19 See Article 2 (4) and (7) Charter of the United Nations 1945. 
20 F H Hinsley ‘Sovereignty’ cited in Wayne Hudson ‘Fables of Sovereignty’ in Trudy Jacobsen et al 
Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (2008) pg 6 at 24. 












Sovereignty is a concept that lacks a specific definition. However, it denotes 
the basic international legal status of a state that it is not subject within its territorial 
jurisdiction to the governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial jurisdiction of a 
foreign state or to foreign law other than public international law.22 Traditionally, 
sovereignty means supreme authority, granting a state exclusive jurisdiction and 
control over all objects and subjects in its territory to the exclusion of all external 
influence.23
Traditional notions of sovereignty (which reflect positivist ideas) imply 
absoluteness, permanence and indivisibility and in the context of international law it 
is understood to be an attribute of the state as a member of the international 
community.
 
24 Since the international community is full of overwhelming variations 
of power, sovereignty is for many (weak) states their only source of protection 
against powerful states.25 Sovereignty is regarded as more than just a functional 
principle of international relations as some states perceive it as recognition of their 
equal worth and dignity.26 For the neorealist, sovereignty is primarily concerned with 
its ‘manifestations’ as a practical institution for managing anarchy, which is defined 
as the absence of formal governmental authority in the international system. 27
 
  
2.2 Internal and External Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty is generally defined with the idea of internal and external 
sovereignty in mind. Constructivists are of the view that sovereignty in both its 
internal and external faces is a social concept produced through the practices of 
states.28
                                                   
22 Helmut Steinberger ‘Sovereignty’ Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2000) vol.4 Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law pg 512. 
 Internal sovereignty is predicated on the principle that each state is free to 
pursue its internal affairs free from outside interference. It essentially means that the 
23 David Held ‘The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty Transformed?’  pg 162. 
Available at http://www.polity.co.uk/global/pdf/GTReader2eHeld.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2009]. 
24 Yoram Dinstein ‘Sovereignty, the Security Council and the Use of Force’ in Michael Bothe et al 
(ed) Redefining Sovereignty: The Use of Force after the Cold War (2005) pg 111. 
25  ICISS Supplementary Report (note 16). 
26 Ibid. 
27Biersteker and Weber (note 11) at 5. 
28 David A Lake ‘The New Sovereignty in international Relations’ (2003) 5 (3) International Studies 












government of any state has supremacy over the people, resources and all other 
authorities within its control and is usually described as empirical sovereignty.29
 On the other hand, external sovereignty envisages recognition by other states 
and implies a relationship of formal equality.
  
30 It implies that each state is 
independent with no authority above it. It is based on the notion that the territorial 
integrity of every state is inviolate and is described as juridical sovereignty.31 An 
illustration of the extent of external sovereignty is found in a statement by Judge 
Huber to the effect that sovereignty in relations between states signifies 
independence to a portion of the globe and the right to exercise therein, to the 
exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state.32
 These dimensions of internal and external sovereignty represent the 
traditional and absolutist nature of sovereignty retained in international practice 
during the late 1970s.
 
33 However, Sikkink has observed that ‘neither the doctrine nor 
practice of internal sovereignty has ever been absolute.’34 She cites as examples the 
Treaty of Augsburg and the Peace of Westphalia, which limited the discretion of the 
monarch in controlling the practice and religion of its subjects and the campaign for 
the abolition of slavery in the 19th century, which made it clear that certain extreme 
practices would be the basis for international concern and action.35 However, until 
the Second World War, in the widest range of issues, the treatment of its population 
remained within the discretion of a state and no important legal doctrine challenged 
the state’s supreme authority within its borders.36
   In the light of this, internal sovereignty as it is traditionally understood 
(absolute control) is being challenged by the growing human rights norms in the 
sense that it seeks to redefine what is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states. Thus, issues which were within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of a state 
 
                                                   
29Samuel Makinda ‘Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United Nations’ (1996) 
2 Global Governance 149 at 150. 
30Lake (note 28) at 305. 
31 Makinda (note 29). 
32Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829. 
33 Lake (note 28). 
34 Kathryn Sikkink ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks’ (1993) 47 (3) International 














have now become an issue of international concern. These are examined more 
extensively in the following sections. 
 
2.3 The Nature of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is a social/ legal construct and as such the roots of its legitimacy tends to 
differ according to time and place.37As a social construct, the understandings of 
sovereignty are usually transformed and this affects the way in which states give 
effect to the concept in their relationships with each other.38 The understanding of 
sovereignty tends to be redefined during and following the conclusion of major wars 
or in the aftermath of widespread political upheavals.’39
Such understandings are a reflection of the norms and principles that underlay 
the legitimacy of a state following a particular era.
 
40 Thus sovereignty is not 
‘exogenous’ to the system but produced through the practice of states and is thus 
influenced by other social norms (such as human rights, self-determination, and 
humanitarian intervention to mention a few).41 These developments in international 
norms suggest a shift in the focus of the nature of sovereignty from the absolute 
Westphalian precepts to limited sovereignty.42
 The generality of the concept of sovereignty together with the differences in 
its meaning and understanding over time makes sovereignty one of the most 
controversial concepts in international law. Sovereignty which was once relatively 
uncontested has become a major cause of disagreement within international law 
particularly with respect to the scope of its application.
 
43 The central argument is that 
the principle of sovereignty despite the significant ideological and institutional 
support it still enjoys has been in steady decline at least since the early part of the 
20th century.44
                                                   
37 Biersteker and Weber (note 11) at 1. 
 Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reflected this change in 
ideology in a statement to the effect that: 
38 Lake (note 28). 
39Barkin and Bruce (note 17) at 114. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Lake (note 28). 
42 Makinda (note 29) at151. 
43 Jens Bartelson ‘The Concept of Sovereignty Revisited’ (2006) 17(2) EJIL 463. 
44Joseph Camilleri ‘Sovereignty Discourse and Practise-Past and Future’ in Trudy Jacobsen et al (eds) 












  The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed; its 
theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of 
states today to understand this and to find a balance between the 
needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an 
ever more interdependent World.45
In the light of recent developments in international law and practice the 
paramount question is does sovereignty remain absolute in the traditional 
Westphalian sense or has it been limited by the recognition of other normative 
concepts such as human rights, humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect? Answering these questions requires an overview of how the 
notion of state sovereignty has developed and transformed over time.




2.4 Historical Development 
The concept of sovereignty is not a modern one and the doctrine was not produced 
by the modern state, as there were no states in this sense until the 19th century.47 
Throughout the course of history, the meaning of sovereignty has undergone 
important change and transformation from the location of the source of its legitimacy 
(in God, in the Monarch or in the people) to the scope of activities claimed under its 
protection.48 This history can be told as one of two broad movements- the first, a 
century’s long evolution towards a Europe continent, then a globe of sovereign states 
and the second a circumscription of absolute sovereign prerogative in the second half 
of the 20th Century.49
2.4.1. Sovereignty pre-World War II 
 
The concept of sovereignty dates back to the time when there were relations among 
disparate territorial entities such as those making up the Holy Roman Empire.50
                                                   
45Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Peace (1995) cited in Camilleri (ibid) at 44. 
 It 
also shows an emergence of increasingly autonomous cities in Northern Italy and in 
Flanders, which gave rise to an understanding among numerically small urban elites 
that certain places could be immune from the authority structures that dominated 
46  Minkkinen (note 4) at 36. 
47 Hudson (note20). 
48 Biersteker and Weber (note 11). 
49 Sovereignty’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy pg 4. Available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty [Accessed 3 March 2009]. 












elsewhere.51 Since the late middle ages, the term sovereignty became a political 
slogan used by territorial princes in their quest to emancipate themselves from or 
resist the claims to universal temporal jurisdiction made by the pope or emperor.52 It 
replaced the medieval mixture of overlapping personal jurisdiction with an exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction and eliminated rivalling powers of nobility and estates.53 It 
established a relationship of immediate obedience between the ruler and individual 
subjects.54
 However, the present foundations of international law regarding sovereignty 
date back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which established what was considered a 
new legal order for European States.
 
55 The Westphalian international legal regime is 
best remembered for codifying state sovereignty and making the territorial state the 
foundation of the modern international system.56 The emergence of a society of 
states first in Europe and later across the globe went hand in hand with a new 
conception of international law which can be referred to as the classic regime of 
sovereignty (from 1648 to the early 20th century).57
  Under the Westphalian system, sovereignty was perceived to reside with 
political leaders and government and not with the civil society.
  
58 This represents the 
traditional notions of sovereignty whereby the state is supreme and not subject to any 
force or authority from within or outside its borders. This notion has occasionally 
served as a defence and excuse for the imposition of dictatorial rule particularly in 
developing countries as a means of avoiding international scrutiny of their domestic 
human rights situations.59
 The history and state practice of the concept of sovereignty was also 
evidenced and influenced by the works of scholars writing at the time. These scholars 
contributed to the literature concerning the scope and extent of sovereignty and the 
holders of sovereignty. These have influenced the differing views of sovereignty 
existing in today’s world. For example, when Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes first 
 
                                                   




55 Makinda (note 29). 
56 Ibid. 
57Held (note 23). 
58Makinda (note 29). 












elaborated the notion of sovereignty in the 16th and 17th centuries, they were 
concerned with establishing the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic 
authority.60
 These writers popularised the idea of sovereignty that originated from the 
Peace Treaties of Westphalia. They envisioned sovereignty as absolute, extending to 
all matters within the territory unconditionally.
 
61 To Bodin the only limit to the 
sovereign’s absolute power was that the leader was subject to God and natural law.62 
The term absolute meant the totality of legislative power and the lack of a higher 
earthly authority and this had a considerable impact on the rise of the state system in 
early modern Europe.63 For Hobbes, the concept of sovereignty envisaged a situation 
wherein ‘the people established sovereign authority through a covenant in which they 
transferred all of their rights to the “Leviathan”, who represented the abstract notion 
of the state.64 The will of the Leviathan reigned supreme and represented the will of 
those who had alienated their rights to it.65
The writings of Machiavelli also influenced the development of the concept of 
sovereignty. In his renaissance discourse, the government, territory and population 
remained the property of the prince.
  
66 The prince was not bound by natural law, 
canon law or any other norm or authorities that obligated members of Christendom.67 
He was supreme within the state’s territory and responsible for the well-being of this 
singular, unitary body.68 To these writers, the form of sovereign that exercised 
sovereign powers could legitimately vary between monarchy and aristocracy but what 
was important was that sovereignty was absolute and never resided in the people.69
However, these absolutist notions of sovereignty were criticised and modified 
later by writers in the 18th century. These writers include John Locke and Rousseau. 
John Locke redefined sovereignty as popular sovereignty and was in line with the 
 
                                                   
60 Stephen D Krasner ‘Sovereignty’2001 pg 21. Available at www.foreignpolicy.com [Accessed 22 
February 2009]. 
61 Jean Bodin On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from The Six Books of the Commonwealth Julian H 
Franklyn (ed) (1992) pg 1Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
62 Ibid at 4. 
63 Ruth Lapidoth ‘Sovereignty in Transition’ 2001 Journal of International Affairs 325 at 326. 
64 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (Ed) Richard Tuck (1991) pg 121 Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
65 Ibid at 130. 
66 Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince and Discourses (1950) cited in Hudson (note 20) at 26. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 












principles of liberal democracy and respect for human rights.70 This concept of 
popular sovereignty was reasserted in the work of Rousseau, who based sovereignty 
of the people on natural rights.71 According to him, the exercise of sovereignty must 
be linked to the will of the people, which means that political leaders must seek 
legitimacy through democratic processes.72
The proponents of popular sovereignty envisage that sovereignty ultimately 
originates from the people and it is a power to be exercised by, for and on behalf of 
the people of a state.
  
73 This then means that sovereignty would be respected only if 
the people of a state have the opportunities to exercise their political, economic and 
cultural rights.74
This idea of popular sovereignty has laid the foundation for other norms such 
as self-determination, democracy, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
protect thus reflecting the growing limitations of the traditional conceptions of 
absolute sovereignty. According to Makinda, if sovereignty were universally 
reinterpreted as popular sovereignty, the international community would then have a 
reason to intervene in states where human rights were violated by a military regime or 
an unelected government.
   
75
However, for many years following the treaty of Westphalia, the traditional 
notions of sovereignty remained absolute in international practice. States resisted any 
attempts to limit or even question the absolutism of their sovereign power.
  
76  This 
was evident in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which established a commission to 
investigate and identify persons, including the Kaiser of Germany Wilhelm II, as 
liable for war crimes, recommending the creation of an international Tribunal.77
                                                   
70 Makinda (note 29) at 151 
 The 
victorious states opposed such an option regarding the trial of a Head of State as 
unprecedented in international and national law and contrary to the basic concept of 
71Hudson (note 20) at 29. 
72 Jean –Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract in Nigel Warburton Philosophy: The Classics (1998) 
pg 100 Routledge, London. See also Hudson (note 20) at 29. 
73 Our Global Neighbourhood, The Report of the Commission on Global  Governance cited in 
Makinda (note 29) at 151. 
74 Makinda (note 29) at 151. 
75 Ibid at 175. 
76 Vesselin Popovski ‘Essay: Sovereignty as Duty to Protect Human Rights.’ Available at 












national sovereignty.78 This was the first notable attempt to crack the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty.79
2.4.2. Sovereignty post-World War II 
  
This era shows a growing number of factors ranging from globalization to 
environmental factors which place certain limitations on the concept of State 
sovereignty.80 These factors and the growth of non-governmental organisations to 
help govern interstate relations and policies ranging from trade and security have 
undermined the scope of sovereignty.81 In addition, as states came to subscribe to 
and participate in external relations in the form of treaties, these imposed certain 
limitations on their will to be independent.82
2.4.2.1.    Sovereignty and Human Rights Norms  
 This era also gave birth to the growth of 
certain principles such as genocide, international criminal law and self-
determination, which influenced the way in which sovereignty, came to be 
constructed by states. 
The experience of the Second World War and above all the holocaust is considered 
the beginning of a new era concerning the perception of absolute sovereignty which 
had dominated political theory and practice since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.83 
The horrors of the Nazi genocide and the lessons from the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials led states to create a series of agreements to protect the human rights of their 
citizens.84 These trials to a large extent succeeded in merging international law with 
certain basic moral principles and gave a clear notice to the nations of the world that 
henceforth, ‘claims of absolute sovereignty must yield to the international 
community’s claim on peace and justice.’85
The end of the World War also gave birth to the United Nations (hereinafter 
the UN) and the United Nations’ Charter (hereinafter referred to as Charter) became 
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the governing legal and institutional framework for States under international law.86 
The Charter on one hand incorporated the concept of human rights in its preamble 
and on the other hand incorporated the traditional concept of sovereignty.87 The 
inclusion of human rights in the Charter inspired the adoption of numerous human 
rights treaties which created binding obligations on State parties to respect the human 
rights of citizens within their territory.88
The recognition and development of human rights norms in particular placed 
certain limitations on what used to be within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of a 
state.
  
89As parts of its obligations, a state was required to provide security for its 
populations and ensure that situations within its borders do not threaten international 
peace and security.90 Consequently, the line between domestic policies and 
international concerns became vague and the autonomy of a state in law making was 
subjected to limitations by international law in respect of certain international 
interests.91
The most notable human rights treaty in this regard is the 1948 United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide which created a 
legal framework for states to override the rights of sovereignty whenever genocide 
was committed.
 
92 By Article 1 of the Convention, state parties recognised that 
genocide is ‘a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and 
punish’.  Thus, they are not merely entitled to prevent genocide but also obliged to 
do so.93 (This acts as the basis for the R2P doctrine, which redefines sovereignty 
from absolute control to responsibility).94
However, in practice, the ability of the international community to oppose 
genocide is hampered by the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention, as 
governments of weaker states are very hesitant to allow great powers the authority to 
intervene in another state’s internal affairs.
  
95
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addressed by the Security Council which has on occasions created international 
criminal tribunals (ICTY, ICTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone) to prosecute 
those accused of perpetrating acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity.96  
These tribunals represent the most direct challenge of state sovereignty by rejecting 
the claims of states when relying on the defences of sovereign immunity and the act 
of state doctrine.97
2.4.2.2   Sovereignty and Self-Determination 
 
The concept of self-determination, which became recognised after World War II as a 
right of peoples in international law, is another normative factor that has contributed 
to challenging the once absolute notion of sovereignty particularly with respect to 
territorial integrity.98 Self-determination, which has its roots in popular sovereignty, 
stresses the link between sovereign authority and a defined population.99
The right to self-determination has both an internal and external aspect. The 
external aspect gives a right to peoples to establish a state or to choose the state to 
which they wish to belong and internally the free choice of government namely 
democracy.
 The right of 
peoples to self-determination is recognised in the Charter, by Article 1 (3) and 
subsequently supported by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. 
100 The right to self-determination as a principle of international law 
relating to sovereignty although not consistently practiced and respected in 
individual cases was supported by the policies of decolonisation.101 During the 
colonial times, self-determination affected traditional notions of sovereignty in the 
sense that peoples were entitled to secede from colonial territories even without the 
consent of the original state.102 This led to the creation of a number of sovereign 
states in Africa and Asia.103
On the other hand, in postcolonial times, the right to self-determination did 
not authorise the dismemberment of the territorial integrity of an existing state, if that 
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state possessed a government representing the whole people without discrimination 
and respected the fundamental human rights of its people.104 However, the exercise 
of the right to self-determination during this period witnessed the break down of 
sovereign states such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia.105
For many years, the provisions of self-determination as enshrined in the 
Charter was interpreted as asserting the right of existing states to determine their 
internal affairs free from outside intervention.
  
106 However, given the changing 
understanding of sovereignty, it could now be interpreted to assert the right of a 
people to have control over its own future thus enhancing the idea of popular 
sovereignty.107
It was therefore the role of the state to act in the interest of itself and its 
population, rather than to act towards some long-term internationalist ideal in a 
manner that might rebound to the detriment of the immediate national interest.
  
108 
Thus, as a result, where the state as represented by the government suppressed the 
peoples, they could arguably seek outside assistance in order to achieve self-
determination. This is implied in the General Assembly Resolution on Aggression.109
As mentioned earlier, the Charter by Article 2(1) inherited and reflected the 
traditional conceptions of sovereign equality. This was because at the time the 
Charter entered into force, international law centred primarily on State sovereignty 
and the independence of states especially with respect to matters of domestic concern 
was of most significance.
 
However, this view is unsettled since states refrain from doing so because it is 
contrary to the provisions of article 2(4) and 2 (7) of the Charter. 
110 This era marked a decolonisation era and the newly 
independent states sought to guard their sovereignty and equality jealously.111
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these states, the institution of sovereignty provided the basis for a political and legal 
restraint on the imposition of values and policies by more powerful states.112
In lieu of this, in as much as states freely participated in human rights treaties, 
their constitutional authority largely remained in tact as they would not allow any of 
these treaties to infringe upon their sovereignty.
   
113
 
 In addition, the principle of state 
sovereignty was buttressed in the Charter by Article 2(4) and (7) concerning the 
prohibition on the use of force and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states 
respectively.  
2.5 The Principle of Non-Intervention114
Before 1648, the principle of non-intervention, which has become a central element 
of modern sovereignty, had not been given recognition as a principle of international 
law.
 
115 Interventions for the protection of religious were considered justified in the 
medieval age but from the time of the Peace of Westphalia, the admissibility of 
religious interventions were terminated.116 The principle of non-intervention implies 
that states are precluded from interfering in the domestic affairs of other sovereign 
states and this is an established principle of customary international law.117 It has 
been suggested that ‘states jealously treasure the principle of non-intervention, and it 
is the chief envy of aspiring states because it is the legal insurance of their sovereign 
existence.’118
 The principle of non-intervention is reflected in the Charter by Article 2(7) 
and provides inter alia that ‘nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise 
the United Nations to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state….’ It is suggested that while this injunction against 
intervention is directed at the UN, it must logically also pertain to states comprising 
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it.119 The principle of non-intervention is also reflected in numerous General 
Assembly declarations. For instance, the General Assembly in Resolution 2131(XX) 
1965 declared that ‘no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any 
reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any state….’120
In the Nicaragua case, 
  
121
The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every 
sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference 
…the court considers that it is part and parcel of customary 
international law and has moreover been presented as a corollary 
of the principle of sovereign equality of states.
the International Court of Justice stated that: 
122
The court went on to state that acts which constituted a breach of the principle of 
non-intervention would also, if they directly or indirectly involved the use of force, 
constitute a breach of the prohibition of the use of force  in international law.
  
123 
Therefore, the aspect of the principle of non-intervention that prohibits acts of 
forcible interventions overlaps with Article 2(4) of the Charter, prohibiting the threat 
or use of force in international affairs.124
During the past years however, the concept of intervention has been given 
qualitative and new meanings.
  
125 Interventions have increasingly been defined in 
terms of the purposes or goals that are radically different from the traditional 
objectives that intervention was expected to achieve.126 It became projected as being 
undertaken by, or on behalf of the international community undertaken to achieve 
humanitarian objectives ‘which are intrinsically far too valuable to be held hostage to 
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2.6. The Prohibition of the Use of Force by States 
The threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
a state is prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter as well as a corresponding 
general rule of customary international law.128 The law prohibiting the use of force 
by states in their international affairs is one of the fundamental obligations of states 
in international law, a breach of which would incur state responsibility.129 Since the 
end of World War 2, international law has prohibited states from threatening or using 
force except in self-defence or pursuant to Security Council authorisation thereby 
reducing the use of force to the barest minimum.130
All members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.  
 Article 2(4) of the Charter 
stipulates that: 
The provision of Article 2(4) is widely regarded as one of the central building 
blocks of the UN and it stipulates a general prohibition of the unilateral use of 
force.131  The prohibition of the use of force by states in their relationship with each 
other complements the obligations of states under Articles 2(3) and 33 of the Charter 
instructing states to settle their disputes by peaceful means.132 The provision of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter is recognised as customary international law and has 
obtained the status of jus cogens, which applies to all states.133
In order to give credence to the prohibition on the use of force, many General 
Assembly Resolutions over time reaffirm this prohibition. These include the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
1965, Declaration on Principles of International Law 1970 and the Definition of 
Aggression 1974. Article 2(4) prevents acts of aggression, defined as ‘the use of 
armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
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Notwithstanding the express prohibition on the use of force however, the 
Charter permits states to use force in self-defence and in enforcement measures 




 Although the era following World War II marked the rise of international human 
rights’ treaties which purportedly limited the absolute nature of sovereignty, ‘the idea 
of limited or conditional sovereignty was just that-an idea.’135 In practice, the UN 
was governed by Article 2(7) of the Charter which protected the state in its existing 
border.136 Anything contained within a state’s border including the most heinous 
violations of human rights was understood to fall into the realm of domestic 
jurisdiction.137 This allowed for gross abuses by governments of their populations, 
including in extreme instances a state committing ethnic genocide without a 
substantive response from the international community.138
 However, with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council began to 
interpret the Charter more frequently to favour human rights over the protection of 
state sovereignty. The recognition of human rights in this era redefined the traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty in the sense that it gradually inspired and shaped the 
decisions of the Security Council in its definitions of threat to the peace and adoption 
of enforcement measures.
 
139 The Security Council qualified situations involving 
systemic human rights violations as threats to the peace, thus opening legal prospects 
for interventions (although subject to controversies).140
Thus, the norm of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of states became 
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dictatorial rule.142 These resolutions by the Security Council were the beginning of 
humanitarian interventions under the auspices of the United Nations. The rationale 
behind these interventions was to favour a redefinition of sovereignty from absolute 
to limited and as such, a state could not claim absolute sovereignty without 
demonstrating a duty to protect people’s rights as it is from their right that it derives 
its own.143
 In each case, the rights of citizens were understood to take precedence over 
the rights of states.
 
144 This gradually weakened the legitimacy of sovereignty 
understood as the inviolability of states.145
 
 Thus, they are constantly relied on as 
proof of the limited nature of sovereignty. Has sovereignty in the 21st century been 
defined to allow for a legally binding right of humanitarian intervention or has 
sovereignty been redefined as the responsibility to protect? Are these norms binding 
on states to the extent of overriding the Westphalian absolutist nature of sovereignty? 
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CHAPTER 3  
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE EVOLUTION OF A NORM? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A quality inherent in sovereignty which has constantly undergone severe challenge is 
the prohibition against intervention in the matters coming within the internal affairs 
of a state of which it has absolute autonomy. This is mainly attributed to 
humanitarian interventions undertaken by states and are often cited as evidence of 
the qualified nature of a state’s sovereignty. This has however been prone to serious 
controversy as, on one hand, there are those (positivists) who claim an international 
order of states governed by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference and on 
the other hand, there are those who contend that human dignity is more fundamental 
than adherence to the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention.146
The proponents of humanitarian intervention contend that with the 
development of international protection of human rights and humanitarian law the 
core of state sovereignty with respect to the exclusive right of a state to govern its 
own citizens according to its discretion has been undermined.
 
147 To them, they 
constitute issues of international security therefore coming within the realm of 
international law.148 Therefore, once international law regulates an issue, it ceases to 
be a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction for the states bound by the rule.149 
Those opposing humanitarian intervention however, classify issues of human rights 
violations as one of domestic jurisdiction coming within the purview of Article 2 (7) 
of the Charter.150
In the last few decades, widespread and gross human rights violations such as 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have arguably come to be 
understood as falling outside the purview of a state’s sovereign authority.
  
151
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Humanitarian intervention advocates therefore argue that when a state is in gross 
violations of such human rights, other states (may) have the liberty to interfere 
without the consent of the state in breach to address such violations.152 This however 
poses a hard test for an international society built on the principles of sovereignty 
(sovereign equality), non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force which 
ensures international stability and order.153
The humanitarian interventions undertaken by states since the inception of 
the United Nations can be classified into pre-1990 and post 1990 interventions.
  
154 
These dates are important because they reflect the attitude of the Security Council 
during and after the Cold War, and how this has influenced the way sovereignty 
came to be constructed.155 From 1945 to the end of the Cold War, the attitude of the 
Security Council (and the United Nations as a whole) was to regard human rights as 
being subordinate to state sovereignty within the framework of the Charter.156 
However, with the end of the Cold War, proponents of a qualified sovereignty 
suggest a change in the attitude of the Security Council, by contending that human 
rights seem to have attained the same or more significance than the claim of states.157
This change in attitude is attributed to the tendency and readiness of the 
Security Council to consider serious violations of human rights in the wake of 
internal armed conflicts, at least those that produce cross border effects as situations 
falling under Article 39 of the Charter.
   
158 Consequently, the Security Council on 
occasions has passed resolutions recognising such domestic conflicts as threats to 
international peace and security and authorised states to use force to address the 
situations.159
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some as setting precedents for humanitarian intervention with the aim of redefining 
state sovereignty.160 However, this contention does not appear to be true because an 
analysis of the facts indicate that these resolutions authorising the  use of force were 
not intended to create a new principle of humanitarian intervention but more likely 
an extension of the ‘classical collective security’ envisaged by Article 42 of the 
Charter.161
This chapter seeks to examine the concept of humanitarian intervention. It 
examines the interventions authorised by the Security Council and their implications 
on state sovereignty. It examines also state practice to determine if a right of 
humanitarian intervention (authorised or unauthorised) exists in customary 
international law to override claims of sovereignty. 
 
 
3.2. Definition and Origin of Humanitarian Intervention 
Although there are varying definitions of humanitarian intervention, it has been 
defined as: 
The justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the 
inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and 
persistently abusive to exceed the limits within which the 
sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.162
It has also been defined by Holzgrefe to mean: 
 
The threat or use of force across state borders by a state or group 
of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave 
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other 
than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied.163
It has been suggested that a more widely accepted definition of humanitarian 
intervention is to regard “interventions authorised by the Security Council for 
humanitarian purposes as casus foedris which, as such, properly fall as precedents 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter because this is where their legal 
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basis is located.”164 Although the practice is to regard humanitarian intervention as 
involving the use of force, it may also include any ‘non-forcible initiative’ of a state 
which has the aim of altering the situations where another state is suspected of 
perpetrating substantial abuse of human rights.165
 The concept of humanitarian intervention can be traced to Hugo Grotius, a 
17th century scholar who postulated that when a sovereign commits atrocities against 
its own subjects, this could be sufficient justification for outsiders to take up arms 
against that sovereign in the defence of all of ‘humankind’.
    
166 Such intervention is 
invoked against a state’s abuse of its sovereignty by the brutal and cruel treatment of 
those within its power and that state was to be regarded as having made itself 
susceptible to action by any state or group of states prepared to intervene.167
 While not generally accepted as a right during Grotius’ time, humanitarian 
intervention was reflected in state practice during the 19th and early 20th century.
  
168 
The most notable interventions during this period were the intervention in Greece by 
England, France and Russia in 1827 to stop Turkish massacre and suppressions of 
populations associated with insurgents and the 1860- 1861 intervention by France in 
Syria to protect the Christians living there.169 In fact, there were at least five other 
prominent interventions undertaken by the European powers against the Ottoman 
Empire from 1827 to 1908.170 It appears that among the 19th century writers, majority 
accepted the idea that, lawful humanitarian intervention existed in customary 
international law although there were considerable doctrinal misunderstandings with 
respect to the legal foundation and the extent of that right.171
  However, with the introduction of the United Nations system, the principle 
of state sovereignty and non-intervention had extreme priority. Sovereignty was 
considered important in preventing inter-state wars and maintaining the international 
legal order that had once been destroyed by the two World Wars.
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intervention, as there was no express mention of the right of humanitarian 




3.3 Legal and Moral Justification of Humanitarian Intervention 
The question which usually arises in the controversy surrounding the right of 
humanitarian intervention is the source of its authority.174 It also concerns the 
normative status of humanitarian intervention as an instrument of international 
justice, which may under certain circumstances, override claims of sovereignty.175 
Usually any attempt to answer this question raises a number of fundamental 
questions about international law and morality, and about the legal and moral 
standing of states in international law.176 This has led Tom Farer to conclude that in 
answering the intervention debate, states will have to choose between compliance 
with formal prohibitions against intervention and the need to respond to pressing 
moral appeals.177
  In defending the legality of humanitarian intervention, the first port of call for 
its proponents is to rely on the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
 
178 In 
particular, emphasis is placed on the provisions of Articles 1(3), 55 and 56 of the 
Charter, which commits states to protect fundamental human rights.179 It is their 
assertion that the development of international human rights norms and international 
humanitarian law has modified the traditional concept of sovereignty.180 This 
prioritisation of human rights norms by international law is said to be evidenced by 
the unique status of certain norms as jus cogens; such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.181
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 Contemporary international law forbids the violation of such norms of jus 
cogens by a state against its own citizens and these duties are owed erga omnes to 
the international community as a whole.182 Consequently, this provides the 
normative framework for humanitarian intervention, as the concept of sovereignty 
cannot be used by governments to protect themselves from responsibility for gross 
violations of such rights.183
 In addition, they suggest that when a liberal interpretation is given to the 
provisions of Article 2 (4), such (unilateral) intervention will not be a violation of 
Article 2(4).
 
184 The reason being that since Article 1(3) of the Charter recognises 
human rights as one of the purposes of the UN; any force used in order to protect 
such rights is not, inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter.185 Instead, such 
intervention should be seen as upholding the stated goals of the United Nations when 
it is unable to take action itself. 186  This line of thinking has it that since 
humanitarian intervention in principle is neither directed against the ‘territorial 
integrity’ nor against the ‘political independence’ of the target state, Article 2(4) does 
not prohibit it.187
  Furthermore, reliance is placed on the provisions of Articles 39 and 42 to 
give legitimacy to humanitarian intervention where authorised by the Security 
Council.
 
188 Since the Security Council is regarded as the guardian of state 
sovereignty and also has the responsibility of maintaining international peace and 
security, this mandate could require it to protect people against authoritarian regimes 
even if this means an alteration of ‘Westphalian’ Sovereignty.189 This is so because 
where there are gross violations of human rights, which have extensive cross border 
effects, they can no longer be considered purely domestic issues but become 
legitimate concerns of the international community.190
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 Therefore, the international community acting under the mandate of the 
Security Council may intervene militarily in order to address situations of extreme 
human suffering.191 In support of this contention, a report of the Commission on 
Global Governance stated inter alia that “When there is human suffering on a large 
scale, it inevitably provokes demands for United Nations action, notwithstanding the 
fact that that such action would constitute external interference in the affairs of 
sovereign States.”192
 Furthermore, proponents of humanitarian intervention assert that since 
international law is constantly evolving in ways that reflect emerging normative 
ideas, an appeal to the law itself may not be adequate to solve the underlying moral 
issues raised by humanitarian intervention.
 This finds justification in the proviso of Article 2(7), to the 
effect that ‘the principle of domestic jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application 
of the enforcement measures under Chapter VII.’ This is to serve as the basis or 
precedent for collective humanitarian intervention. 
193 Consequently, they rely on moral 
norms to justify unilateral interventions undertaken by a state or group of states 
acting without the authority of the Security Council. This is because humanitarian 
intervention is usually a response to grave human rights violations and the most basic 
human rights are universal moral rights (such as right to life), rights that rest on the 
principles of ‘common morality’ which are binding on all human beings.194
 The reliance on moral norms is influenced by the jurisprudence of natural law 
scholars writing in the 16th and 17th   century before the emergence of modern 
international law such as Immanuel Kant.
 
195According to these views, the ruler 
(state) has a duty to enforce certain laws beyond their realms (jus gentium or law of 
nations) an example being the protection of the rights of its subjects.196 The full 
recognition of the ruler’s (state) sovereignty is conditioned upon the full recognition 
of human rights of the population within its territory.197
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fundamental human rights and ‘shocks the conscience of mankind’ humanitarian 
intervention is permissible.198
 In the words of Teson, ‘only just states deserve to be fully protected by the 
shield of sovereignty.’
  
199 A just state is entitled to respect by other states which are 
morally barred from interfering with its government.200 It envisages that the same 
principles that justify non-intervention (sovereignty) also justify exceptions to the 
principle.201 Therefore, if a state is in serious violation of the moral rights of those it 
governs, others may defend those rights by using force.202 The non-intervention 
principle is not a shield behind which an unjust state can hide while it violates the 
moral rights of its subjects.203
 These arguments find support in the idea of popular sovereignty postulated by 
John Locke and Rousseau writing in the 18th century. Based on this school of 
thought, it is the individual and not the state that lies at the centre of international 
law.
 
204 Sovereignty does not reside in the ‘abstraction’ called the state but with the 
people of the state itself.205 Consequently, when a state engages in substantial human 
right abuses, it betrays the purpose for which it exists and forfeits not only its 
domestic legitimacy, but also its international legitimacy as well.206
Therefore, since sovereignty lies in the people, there is a moral duty 
incumbent on states to intervene to protect the population from genocide and other 
crimes against humanity.
  
207 This appears to be the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999 as the Secretary General of 
NATO while justifying its unilateral intervention relied on the existence of a ‘moral 
duty’ to protect the population rather than on a legal obligation to do so.208
However, while agreeing with the esteemed position of the individual in the 
society, the idea of popular sovereignty has however not attained consensus in 
 
                                                   
198 Oppenheim (note 13) at 312. 
199 Fernando R Teson A Philosophy of international Law (1998) pg 40. 
200 Nardin (note 194) at 67. 
201 Teson (note 199). 
202  Nardin (note 194) at  67. 
203 Ibid.  
204 Simons (note 180). 
205Makinda (note 29) at 151. 
206 Teson (note 146) at 16. 
207 Bellamy and Wheeler (note 153) 
208 Dr Javier Solana Secretary General of NATO Press Statement Media Release, (23 March 1999). 












international law and practice. If it has been so accepted, there will be humanitarian 
interventions undertaken in places such as Sudan, Tibet and other places were there 
are gross human rights  violations and these would have been sufficient basis for 
states to intervene in Rwanda without the necessity of Security Council 
authorisation. In addition, it appears that these moral justification proffered by 
scholars in support of unilateral intervention based on notions of morality have no 
bearing under current international law.209
By the end of the 19th century, the natural law argument favouring 
humanitarian intervention had eroded as the view that international law is positive 
law based on the will of states emerged.
 
210 For example, William Hall has argued 
that if there is any basis for humanitarian intervention, it must rest not on principles 
of international morality but on agreement among states to recognise such principles 
as law.211 More importantly, natural law does not appear as one of the sources of 
international law under the Statute of the International Court of Justice.212
 
 
3.4 Arguments against Humanitarian Intervention 
Although the foregoing arguments in support of humanitarian intervention are 
persuasive in justifying the proposition that the norms associated with the 
Westphalian notions of sovereignty are overridden by the development of certain 
normative principles, the universal validity of these arguments are questioned.213 For 
example, the suggestion that a liberal interpretation of Article 2(4) will provide a 
legal foundation for humanitarian intervention finds no basis in the accepted rules of 
treaty interpretation.214 An examination of the travaux preparatories and a textual 
interpretation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter shows that its provisions were meant to 
be a ‘watertight’ prohibition against the use of force and any customary right to 
unilateral intervention which may have existed were extinguished by the Charter.215
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Moreover, it is neither realistic nor politically possible for the intervening 
state(s) to allow the abusive government to remain in power after the intervention.216 
Evidence has shown that most humanitarian intervention usually results in the 
eventual assault of state sovereignty by overthrowing the existing regime and 
occupation of the territory by the intervening forces.217 This is contrary to a proper 
understanding of the phrase ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’ which 
were added to the text merely to reinforce the prohibition contained in this provision 
for the benefit of smaller states and not in order to restrict its absolute scope as 
suggested by humanitarian intervention advocates.218
In addition, many commentators, particularly civilian humanitarian groups 
dislike the association of anything humanitarian with the use of military force, 
perceiving humanitarian intervention as an oxymoron.
 
219 The reason for the criticism 
is not necessarily a lack of feeling for human rights but mainly the fear that any 
erosion of the principle of sovereignty only increases the vulnerability of weaker 
states to more powerful states.220 This is because with respect to these normative 
factors, there is no consensus among international actors.221
On one hand, the Western world holds that the principle of non-intervention 
cannot be invoked by a state against a humanitarian initiative by another state if 
human rights are at stake to which both states as parties to the two United Nations 
human rights covenants are bound to respect.
  
222 On the other hand, several Asian, 
Islamic and other developing countries “continue to challenge the universality of 
human rights norms, stating that human rights more often than not reflect western 
ethical and moral standards” and that they continue to belong to the internal affairs of 
a state of which no other state may interfere.223
Another argument against humanitarian intervention is that its inclusion or 
tolerance in international law as evidence of a normative factor which has altered the 
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traditional notion of sovereignty would only increase the prospect for the abusive use 
of force.224 It would become an instrument for interference by strong states in the 
affairs of the weak with humanitarian concerns serving as justifications for such 
interventions.225 As established by past practice most states are not be inclined to 
undertake humanitarian intervention unless their national interests are directly or 
indirectly involved.226
As it is, there can be no such thing as humanitarian intervention as states are 
always in pursuit of their own strategic interests and goals and not on altruistic 
ones.
  
227 Anything resembling a humanitarian intervention only occurs on occasions 
when human rights concerns coincide with political power objectives.228
When the element of selectivity is added to the way and manner in which 
humanitarian interventions are undertaken, and the fact that the same criteria is not 
applied uniformly in each case where interventions have been embarked on, the norm 
of humanitarian intervention looses credibility in the eyes of many.
 This was 
evident in the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003.  
229 This is 
because the legitimacy of a principle is undermined by the erratic or worse, evidently 
selective application of that principle.230 This was implicit in the delay of the 
international community or states to act promptly to prevent the death of thousands 
of Tutsis in Rwanda while they acted promptly in Bosnia. This inconsistency may be 
attributed to the fact that humanitarian intervention is ‘hijacked by the national 
interests and ethnocentrism’ of powerful states in obvious disregard for the principles 
of sovereign equality.231
Consequently, most states continue to hold on to sovereignty in its most 
absolute form denying any claim to its erosion. This is evident in the words of 
President Bouteflika of Algeria who while reacting to humanitarian intervention 
stated, that “sovereignty is our last defence in an unequal world.”
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has been interpreted to mean a strong reminder that the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention were actually designed as ‘dams against the historical floods of 
imperial interventions by more powerful states and the threat of these is perceived as 
real.’233
Although these criticisms (selectivity and potential abuse) do not come within 
the purview of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ as sources of international law, 





3.5 Overview of Humanitarian Interventions under the Auspices of the 
United Nations 
Over the past decade, there have been a number of interventions in the affairs of 
other states on humanitarian grounds and the Security Council (impliedly) through its 
resolutions has contributed to the literature concerning humanitarian interventions. 
As stated earlier, the humanitarian interventions undertaken under the auspices of the 
United Nations can be classified into pre-1990 and post 1990 interventions reflecting 
the attitude of the Security Council during and after the Cold War.235
 A brief analysis of these interventions will illustrate the status of 
humanitarian intervention in contemporary international law. In particular, the 
reasons given by states as basis for the interventions embarked by them are 
significant in their construction of the nature of sovereignty and the standing of 
humanitarian intervention in international law. 
  
3.5.1 Pre-1990 Humanitarian Intervention 
The pre-1990 interventions encompass a number of interventions undertaken from 
the period of the birth of the United Nations in 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 
1990. During this period (which marked the Cold War era), armed humanitarian 
intervention was not a legitimate practice because states placed more significance on 
sovereignty and order than on the enforcement of human rights norms.236
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intervention are the interventions in East Pakistan, Cambodia and Uganda 
unilaterally undertaken by India, Vietnam and Tanzania respectively.237
 The deadlock in the Security Council and the existence of the veto during the 
period of the Cold War made interventions under the auspices of the United Nations 
impossible or if undertaken without Security Council mandate as unauthorised 
intervention.
  
238 Consequently, the intervening states of India, Tanzania and Vietnam 
justified their interventions on grounds of self-defence rather than on the right of 
humanitarian intervention.239 In addition, the fact that there were other known cases 
where entire ethnic or political groups were being massacred by their own states (for 
example the Biafrans in Nigeria in 1968) without any third state coming to their 
assistance showed the reluctance of states not engaged in such internal situations to 
bind themselves to such a principle.240
Basically, evidence of state practice from 1945 to 1990 is inconclusive as it is 
insufficient to sustain either a right of humanitarian intervention in customary 
international law or an equivocal rejection of the concept.
 
241
3.5.2 Post-1990 Humanitarian Interventions 
 Sovereignty in practice 
remained absolute and any intervention was perceived as a violation of that 
sovereignty no matter what the circumstances were. 
This period witnessed a number of controversial humanitarian interventions 
undertaken by states during the period of 1991 to 1999.242 The pattern established 
was for most states or regional bodies to rely on Security Council resolutions for 
humanitarian intervention or for the United Nations to undertake such operations 
itself.243 The reliance on the Security Council was because at the end of the Cold 
War, the political climate changed dramatically and the Council was more unified in 
passing resolutions authorising the use of force in the territories of states to address 
humanitarian situations.244
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The Council adopted series of resolutions which expanded the definition of 
threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter which 
allowed it to authorise military interventions to respond to grave human rights 
violations even where such crisis were purely domestic in nature.245 The Security 
Council acknowledged that gross violations of human rights in the territory of one 
state may have the effect of generating cross border effects affecting other states.246
The Security Council passed resolutions in relation to Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, 
Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo, that made some link between human rights 
and international peace and security under its Chapter VII mandate.
 
247 Consequently, 
(some) states began to rely on such Chapter VII mandates of the Security Council as 
opening legal prospects for intervention and setting precedents for humanitarian 
interventions.248 To them, the rationale behind these resolutions was to favour a 
redefinition of sovereignty from being absolute to limited.249
On the contrary, an analysis of the authorised interventions undertaken shows 
that the Security Council had on no occasion sought to erode the traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty nor did it seek to set precedents for humanitarian 
interventions.
  
250 At all times, the Security Council acted within the framework of 
Article 2(7) of the Charter and was only willing to take action when these 
humanitarian catastrophes had extensive cross border effects.251 For example, it is 
arguable that Resolution 688 which authorised the use of force in Iraq was not in 
reaction to the way and manner in which the government of Iraq treated its 
population but to address the cross border effects this had on other states or better 
still in reaction to the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.252
This can be inferred from the fact that the relief action did not recognise a 
right of Kurdish self-determination as the Council proclaimed its respect for the Iraqi 
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territorial integrity at all times.253 On the part of the General Assembly, members 
‘expressed the need for the consent of the state inhabited by severely affected 
populations.’254
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states 
must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should 
be provided with the consent of the affected country and in 
principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.
 They stated inter alia that: 
255
In the case of Somalia, Sierra Leone and East Timor, the most notable factors 
are that the interventions were undertaken with the consent of the government or 
because there was no functioning government.
 
256 In East Timor, although the 
Security Council had authorised an Australian led UN force to take all necessary 
measure to restore peace and security, neither the United Nations nor Australia was 
willing to intervene without the consent of the Indonesian government.257 Thus, the 
East Timor intervention is best described as a peacekeeping operation rather than a 
precedent for humanitarian intervention because of the element of consent by the 
Indonesian government.258
In the case of Somalia, both China and India were cautious of the United 
Nations in either taking or supporting action that would infringe upon the domestic 
jurisdiction and sovereignty of any state.
  
259 It appears therefore that members of the 
Security Council sanctioned any intervention only after acknowledging that since the 
governmental authority had collapsed and there was no functioning state whose 
authority is challenged, such intervention could proceed without threatening the 
principles of state sovereignty.260
Although the intervention in Sierra Leone by the ECOMOG forces was 
unilateral, it appears that the international community tolerated it because ECOMOG 
justified its intervention on grounds of regional stability and that its intervention was 
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at the request of the legitimate government of Sierra Leone.261 If added to the fact 
that Sierra Leone was considered in most quarters to be a failed state, such external 
intervention does not derogate from state sovereignty for none exists.262
The NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) was the most controversial 
intervention to occur under the auspices of the United Nations in the 1990s. It was 
the most controversial in the sense that it was the first time since the Cold War that a 
group of states acting without explicit Security Council authority defended a breach 
of sovereignty on humanitarian grounds.
 This also 
appears to be the case for the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia. 
263 It is obvious that the NATO members 
faced a legal and moral dilemma between international law prohibiting the use of 
force and sanctity of sovereignty and the goal of stopping widespread grave 
violations of international human rights.264
Although the international community acknowledged the need to stop the 
‘horrendous’ crimes against humanity and the massive expulsions in Kosovo, the 
intervention was criticised primarily because it risked destabilising the international 
order prohibiting states from intervening in the internal affairs of other states.
  
265 
Russia, China, India and other members of the United Nations emphasised the 
traditional indisputable norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity over the concept 
of human rights, which was to be within the domestic jurisdiction of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.266
 
 In all the intervention was criticised as a violation of the 
Yugoslav sovereignty. 
 3.6      Implications on the Formation of Customary International Law 
It is a settled fact among international law scholars that the right of humanitarian 
intervention is not recognised in the UN Charter and neither are there any 
multilateral treaties to which states are parties, which sanction humanitarian 
intervention. The question which then arises is whether a right to humanitarian 
intervention exists under customary international law? This question becomes 
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necessary, as proponents of humanitarian intervention have gone beyond the Charter 
to argue that international law under certain circumstances authorises unilateral 
intervention because customary international law possesses transformative 
capacity.267
            By Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
‘international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ is a source of 
international law. Such customary law is derived from a consistent and general state 
practice and opinio juris.
 Does an analysis of state practice show any customary right of 
humanitarian intervention? 
268 When examining state practice, it is important to take 
into consideration the duration, consistency, repetition and generality of the practice 
of states with respect to a norm.269 In the case of opinio juris, it is a subjective 
element which is necessary to distinguish between the actions of states which are 
motivated by ‘courtesy’ or other (moral/political) reasons and actions of states 
undertaken on the belief that the action is found in a rule of international law or 
‘legally obligatory.’270 This was reiterated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case where it 
was stated inter alia that in order to deduce the existence of customary rules, it is 
sufficient that the conduct of the states should in general be consistent with such 
rules and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should be 
generally treated as breaches of that rule and not as an indication of the recognition 
of a new rule.271
The armed actions that individual states, regional organisations and ad hoc 
coalitions have taken in the name of preserving human security comprise the body of 
state practice in issue.
  
272
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continued respect for the norms enshrined in state sovereignty. With respect to the 
unauthorised intervention that took place during this period, they witnessed great 
criticism by other states and non-governmental humanitarian organisations.  
In addition, the fact that the states never sought to rely on a legal right to 
humanitarian intervention also proves a lack of opinio juris. It is suggested that, 
opinio juris functions as a check on the behaviour of powerful states so that the most 
influential and active states cannot abuse state practice as a caveat to establish 
customary international law by their actions alone.273
If a state (or group of states) acts in a way that is prima facie 
incompatible with a recognised rule, but defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the 
rule itself, then whether or not the state’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to 
confirm rather than weaken the rule.
 In addition, the words of the 
ICJ are significant with respect to any claim of the erosion of state sovereignty when 
it states that:  
274
The lack of international consensus after the NATO intervention shows that 
there was no state practice at the time and weakens any case for citing it as a 
precedent for humanitarian intervention. With respect to state practice and opinio 
juris, it is significant that both Russia and China, members of the Security Council 
criticised it and that most member states who participated in the intervention 
maintained that it was a singular incident and not intended to set a precedent 
modifying the use of force regime and by implication state sovereignty.
 
275
 On the other hand, the fact that a Security Council resolution proposed by 
Russia, to formally condemn the NATO action was rejected by other members of the 
Security Council, and the fact that the Secretary General of the United Nations failed 
to condemn the intervention, implies acquiescence by the United Nations which is 
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3.7 Conclusion  
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the attitude of the Security Council (and the 
international community as a whole) was to permit collective humanitarian 
intervention only to the extent that it did not threaten the rights and privileges 
traditionally associated with state sovereignty.277 At no time did the Council 
authorise forcible intervention against a ‘fully-functioning’ state and intervention 
without the authority of the Security Council was always criticised.278
While the principle of sovereignty had not barred past interventions, 
sovereignty in its absolute nature has acted quite effectively as a normative 
requirement by forcing potential or actual interveners to justify their actions before 
their sovereign and legal equals.
  
279 The United Nations at all times refused to 
endorse a general doctrine of humanitarian intervention proceeding instead on a case-
by-case basis.280 An analysis of the Security Council resolutions authorising 
interventions illustrate the consistency of the Council in defining issues constituting a 
threat to international peace and security, but reveals an inconsistency in its post 
Cold War attempts to redefine state sovereignty.281
On the other hand, it is apparent that a customary international law supporting 
a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention does not exist.
  
282 For example in 1999 
when Kofi Annan referred to a developing norm in favour of humanitarian 
intervention, there was a general rejection by states.283 This means that the normative 
scene is still cloudy, and the extent to which the international society has moved 
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SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 




The above question was posed to the international community by former UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his millennium report to the General Assembly, 
following the controversial intervention by NATO in Kosovo.286 After the NATO 
intervention, the international community was caught up in a lot of political, legal 
and moral debate concerning the use of force to stop humanitarian crisis in the 
territories of other sovereign states.287 At the time of the millennium summit, most 
states had expressed the view that the concept of humanitarian intervention was a 
grave challenge to the ‘supreme’ principle of sovereignty in international law and 
there was no legal justification whatsoever for humanitarian intervention.288 Just like 
all other humanitarian interventions before it, these controversies did not settle once 
and for all the nature and limits of state sovereignty.289
  However, in response to this challenge posed by Kofi Annan, the Canadian 
government in September 2000 financed the establishment of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereinafter referred to as the 
ICISS).
  
290 The task of the ICISS was ‘to build a broader understanding of the 
problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and 
sovereignty.’291
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whose authority.’292 The membership of the ICISS was intended to reflect as much 
as possible the perspectives of both developed and developing countries in attaining 
consensus regarding the debate on humanitarian intervention.293
 Eventually, the ICISS produced a report which developed the concept of ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect’ (hereinafter referred to as R2P) to solve the legal and 
policy dilemmas of humanitarian intervention.
 
294 In its report, the ICISS proposed a 
redefinition of sovereignty by perceiving it as responsibility rather than control.295 
The idea of sovereignty as responsibility had earlier been proposed in 1996 by 
Francis Deng and his associates.296 They argued that, “when nations fail to conduct 
their internal affairs in ways that meet up with internationally recognised standards, 
other nations not only have a right but also a duty to intervene.”297
 According to the ICISS, ‘the debate about intervention for human protection 
purposes should focus not on the right to intervene but on the responsibility to 
protect.’
  
298 This implies evaluating the issues from the point of view of those who 
need support (that is the oppressed population) rather than those considering 
undertaking the intervention.299 The R2P as proposed by the ICISS has itself become 
an issue of international interest and controversy and has been described as reflective 
of the ‘assertive manifestations of post-Westphalian thinking and of political 
liberalism and human solidarism’.300 Sovereignty as responsibility entails that states 
are only entitled to full sovereignty as long as they abide by the norms established by 
the international community.301
This chapter examines the R2P, its evolution and retrogression. In particular, 
it examines whether the R2P has emerged as a principle guiding humanitarian 
intervention thereby overriding the rights associated with Westphalian sovereignty. 
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4.2 What is the Responsibility to Protect? 
The responsibility to protect (R2P) is often referred to as an emerging doctrine 
primarily designed to provide an international framework for protecting civilians 
facing gross human rights atrocities.302
Sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from avoidable catastrophe, from mass murder, rape and 
starvation-but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, the 
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 
states.
 The R2P reflects the idea that: 
303
In practice this means that if a state fails in its responsibility to protect its citizens, the 
international community must then assume this responsibility on its behalf.
 
304 Thus, 
sovereignty becomes an internationally shared responsibility and national sovereignty 
becomes a ‘privilege’ dependent on the fulfilment of responsibilities.305
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state 
is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-





This implies that the interest of the population may sometimes ‘trump’ sovereignty as 
it is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the Charter with its emphasis on non-intervention in 
the domestic affairs of member states.
 
307 The R2P is thus significant in the way it 
affects sovereignty because matters affecting the welfare of its population are no 
longer exclusively subject to the discretion of the domestic ruler but perceived as 
issues concerning the international community as a whole.308
 According to the ICISS as indicated by past practice, sovereignty implies a 
dual responsibility; ‘externally to respect the sovereignty of other states and internally 
to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within its territory.’
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regard, it argues for a modern perceptive of state sovereignty evolving in the context 
of changing norms which transforms the world from a territorial and state- centric 
sovereignty where those in power control sovereignty to popular sovereignty in the 
context of democratic principles.310
State sovereignty in its most basic form is being redefined…. 
[S]tates are now widely understood to be instruments at the 
service of their people and not vice- versa. At the same time 
individual sovereignty by which I mean the fundamental 
freedom of each individual enshrined in the Charter of the UN 
and subsequent international treaties has been enhanced by a 
renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.
 This argument for popular sovereignty had earlier 
been proposed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. According to him,  
311
Thus, sovereignty is to be understood as upholding human rights precepts in addition 
to territorial control and inviolability.
 
312
According to the ICISS, the case for thinking of sovereignty as responsibility 
is increasingly acknowledged in state practice and is particularly strengthened by the 
importance placed on international human rights norms and the increasing impact in 
international discourse of the concept of human security.
  
313 The UN Charter is cited 
as an example of an international obligation voluntarily accepted by states as 
binding.314 The ICISS argues that on signing the Charter, it grants membership of the 
UN to the state and accepts it as a responsible member of the international 
community and alternatively, the signatory state accepts the responsibilities of 
membership flowing from that signature.315 Although the ICISS makes a convincing 
proposition, in practice states have ignored these responsibilities because they are in 
fact not a prerequisite for state sovereignty.316
 By balancing the rights of a state with its responsibilities to the international 
community who must intervene when the state fails to fulfil its responsibilities to its 
citizens, the R2P (sovereignty as responsibility) poses a challenge to the Westphalian 
notion of independent sovereign states.
 
317
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with humanitarian intervention the same belief that sovereignty is not absolute in an 
interdependent world.318 However, despite the fact that the R2P outlines criteria for 
external intervention in the internal affairs of a state, its advocates argue that the 
doctrine is in effect pro-sovereignty.319 It is considered ‘a linking concept that bridges 
the divide between intervention and sovereignty’.320
Thus far, from undermining state sovereignty as the fundamental organising 
principle of international law, the R2P (its advocates argue) seeks to address the 
failure inherent in sovereignty as control.
  
321 In the words of the ICISS, ‘there is no 
transfer or dilution of state sovereignty but there is a necessary re-characterisation 
from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility.’322 This re-
characterisation is considered important because a large gap has been developing 
between international behaviour as expressed in the ‘state-centred’ UN Charter 
signed in 1946 and evolving state practice since then which now emphasises certain 
limits on sovereignty.323 However, this opposition between sovereignty as control and 
responsibility is neither clear nor coherent within the report of the ICISS.324
Although the R2P doctrine is not yet legally binding on states, it has been 
argued that it serves as an international endorsement of existing international legal 
obligations.
 
325 According to the ICISS, the legal foundation of the R2P is found in 
fundamental natural law principles, the human rights provisions inherent in the UN 
Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and particularly the Genocide 
Convention of 1948.326 The Genocide convention remains one of the relatively few 
instances prior to the adoption of the R2P doctrine, which reflects an attempt by the 
international community to place certain limits on state sovereignty.327
However, regarding reliance on the Genocide Convention as a foundational 
basis for the R2P doctrine, the emphasis of the Convention was on the prevention and 
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punishment of genocide.328 This obligation to prevent and punish genocide under the 
convention, which is also reflected in the outcome document of the 2005 World 
Summit, does not however bestow on states the right of humanitarian intervention.329 
It has however been argued that the prevention of genocide may require a state or 
international organisation as the case maybe to breach the sovereignty of another state 
before it has actually committed any violation.330
According to the ICISS, the R2P embraces three specific responsibilities: the 
responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to 
rebuild.
 
331 These responsibilities fall by default on the state concerned but when it is 
unable or fails to discharge any of these responsibilities, they fall on the international 
community.332 In broad terms, none of these elements of the R2P either singularly or 
as a whole is an entirely new concept in international law.333 The responsibilities to 
prevent (regarded as the most important aspect of the R2P) and rebuild represent 
conflict prevention and state building, and there is consensus among states that they 
are desirable goals.334 By far the most controversial is the responsibility to react. It 
embraces the same tenets as humanitarian intervention and argues that the 
international community in discharging its responsibility to protect may under certain 




4.3 The Responsibility to React 
Although given a new name, the substantive issues of the responsibility to react 
remain the same as those of humanitarian intervention.336
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peril remains as hotly contested as its predecessor.337 According to the ICISS, where 
preventive measures fail to resolve humanitarian crisis in a state and the state is 
unable to contain the crisis, the members of the international community may take 
‘interventionary’ measures to address the situation.338 These measures include 
political, economic or judicial measures and in extreme cases may include military 
action.339
 Just like the notion of humanitarian intervention before it, the responsibility to 
react challenges the principle of non-intervention. The non-intervention rule seeks not 
only to protect the state and its government but also the peoples and cultures within 
it.
 
340 The ICISS recognised that intervention might be harmful in the sense that it can 
destabilise the order of states as internal forces seeking to oppose a state may solicit 
outside help to achieve their own goals.341 Therefore, in order to avoid this 
unnecessary interference with the internal affairs of a state, the ICISS laid down six 
criteria for military intervention.342
 According to the ICISS, military intervention for human protection purposes 
may be justified only where there is large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, either 
actual or apprehended which is the product of deliberate state action, state neglect, 
inability to act or a failed state situation.
 
343 In addition, before contemplating the use 
of force in discharging the responsibility to react, the intervening state(s) or 
international community as the case may be, must have the right intention: the use of 
force must be the last resort; should be undertaken by proportional means; have 
reasonable prospects in the sense that it should not cause more harm and casualties 
than the harm it seeks to protect; and must be undertaken by the right authority most 
preferably the Security Council.344
These principles regulating the use of force largely reflect the traditional just 
war theories postulated by Christian theologians such as Grotius, Thomas Aquinas 
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and Augustine.345 The aim of the high threshold set by the ICISS for warranting 
military intervention is to prevent the abuse of humanitarian justifications by 
powerful states seeking to justify actions taken for reasons that have little or nothing 
to do with humanitarian concern.346
In line with the principle of Westphalian sovereignty and its correlatives of 
non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force as enshrined in the Charter, 
the most important of these criteria is that in all case of military intervention, there 
should be prior Security Council authorisation.
  
347 The ICISS urges permanent 
members of the Security Council to commit themselves not to exercise their veto 
power in such extreme cases of violations of human rights unless their vital national 
interests are at stake.348
Conversely, in the case of a veto by the Security Council, the ICISS suggests 
that the General Assembly could consider the matter under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
procedure or alternatively action could be taken by regional or sub regional 
organisations under chapter VIII of the Charter subject to subsequent authorisation of 
from the Security Council.
  
349 As it stands, these provisions were subsequently 
eliminated by states limiting the use of force as a last resort and only with prior 
authorisation by the Security Council.350
 
 
4.4 International Reception of the Responsibility to Protect 
According to the ICISS, although ‘there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim 
the emergence of a new principle of customary international law’, the responsibility 
to protect is indeed the subject of an ‘emerging guiding principle’.351
 
 This section 
examines the practice of states since the development of the R2P doctrine by the 
ICISS in 2001 to see if in fact it has attained the status of customary law or an 
international law norm. 
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4.4.1 The Responsibility to Protect in Africa  
The doctrine of the R2P made some considerable progress in the international 
community and the most notable is its adoption in the African continent.352 This is so 
because Africa has hosted some of the world’s most violent conflicts and civil wars 
leading to massive humanitarian crisis.353 The adoption of the R2P doctrine is 
reflected in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), which formally replaced 
the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) in 2002.354
The AU Constitutive Act (Act) gives the Union ‘the right to intervene 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’
 
355 Although the Act uses the phrase 
‘right to intervene’ instead of the responsibility to protect, they however have the 
same implications as they both call for intervention in serious cases of human rights 
violations and widespread killings such as genocide.356 The inclusion of the R2P 
doctrine in the Constitutive Act appears to have transformed humanitarian 
intervention from a moral duty or a norm into a legal obligation.357
Although this inclusion of a right to intervene in the affairs of other states 
seems to be a contradiction of the long-standing principle of non-interference held 
among African States, an adoption of treaty interpretation provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of Treaties may be used to reconcile this contradiction.
  
358
                                                   
352 Thelma Ekiyor ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine in Africa’ (2007) FES 
Briefing paper. Available at 
 If 
the Constitutive Act is interpreted in good faith and in light of its object and purposes, 
the AU would have the right to intervene in the affairs of African states where there is 
a conflict which constitutes a major setback to the promotion of peace, security and 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/FESBP01-
07_Ekiyor_R2P_in_Africa.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2009]. 
353 Ibid.  
354See generally the preamble Constitutive Act of the African Union (2002). Available at 
http://www.africa-union.org [Accessed 31 March 2009]. 
355 Ibid Article 4(h). 
356Ekiyor (note 352). 
357 Helene Gandois ‘Sovereignty as responsibility to protect or African regional organisation as norm 
setters’ (2005). Available at 
http://oxford.academia.edu/documents/0001/2131/GandoisBISApaper2005.pdf [Accessed 29 July 
2009]. 













stability.359 This is because the promotion of peace, security and stability is a 
prerequisite for the implementation of its development and integration agenda.360
However, the significance of the R2P as a norm within the Continent is not 
clear, as its implementation is proving difficult, as the R2P norm has been rarely 
invoked within the region.
   
361 This shortcoming is primarily because of the practice of 
the African states to hold on to the strict principle of state sovereignty, which for a 
long time was a sacred understanding among them under the auspices of the OAU 
irrespective of its constant violation.362
The AU has insisted that the R2P should not be used as a pretext to undermine 
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states.
  
363 In an African mini-
summit on Darfur held by the initiative of Libya and Egypt, the African states 
reaffirmed a commitment to preserve Sudanese sovereignty and expressly rejected 
any foreign (UN or Western) intervention whatsoever ‘in this pure African issue’, 
insisting that regional solutions should take precedence over international actions.364 
The AU is generally concerned that the R2P could be just another tool in the hands of 
the great powers in order to interfere in affairs of other states particularly the weak 
states.365
The interpretation of the R2P doctrine by the AU also becomes problematic in 
the sense that it implies that it is the AU and not the Security Council which may 
assume the primary responsibility in the face of humanitarian emergencies where the 
state concerned has failed in its responsibilities.
 
366
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Security Council the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and 
security.367
The amendment of Article 4(h) in 2003 to include ‘serious threats to 
legitimate order’ as an additional basis for warranting intervention by the Union has 
been described as a ‘backward step’ in the development of the R2P doctrine within 
the region.
  
368 This inclusion can be rightly interpreted as reprioritising regime 
security over human security (that is sovereignty as control over sovereignty as 
responsibility).369 These complexities have led to questions of the validity of the R2P 
doctrine.370
4.4.2 The Responsibility to Protect and the War in Iraq 
 
The R2P doctrine acquired positive response by most governments at least at the 
declaratory level.371 It was perceived by some states and the ‘civil society’ as a 
welcome initiative to redefine sovereignty by shifting emphasis from control to 
responsibility although there were concerns expressed by developing countries that it 
could be used to further erode their sovereignty.372 However, members of the ICISS 
sought to alleviate the fears and concerns of these developing countries by pointing to 
the high threshold, which had to be satisfied before any state could legitimately use 
force in the territory of a sovereign state.373 Although the use of these just cause 
criteria was an innovative attempt by the ICISS to curtail abuse of the R2P doctrine, 
there is also inherent in these criteria the problem of indeterminacy as there can be no 
control as to its application.374
 The invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies greatly affected the 
standing of the R2P doctrine as an emerging international law norm in a number of 
ways. Firstly, it reaffirmed the difficulty in obtaining consensus on what made a good 
 This was apparent in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by 
the United States and some of its allies. 
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case for intervention.375 The fact that emerging normative framework guiding 
humanitarian intervention was set in ambiguous terms, gave a certain amount of 
legitimacy to the Iraq war.376 Arguably, the justification of regime change given by 
the US as one of the reasons warranting intervention in Iraq appears to adhere to the 
criteria of right intention and reasonable prospects.377
The brutality and misrule of the Saddam Hussein administration posed a 
threat to the human security of the Iraqi people.
  
378 Consequently, it could be argued 
that since the regime had failed to live up to the responsibilities that sovereignty 
entailed the intervention was necessary to address this failure.379 However, most 
states and the international community who saw the intervention as an apparent abuse 
of the Iraqi sovereignty rejected this justification.380
Secondly, the United States’ ‘circumvention’ of the Security Council and its 
humanitarian justifications had the mixed effect of diluting the normative aspect of 
the sovereignty as responsibility doctrine while emphasizing its old realist dimension 
of sovereignty as right (control).
 
381 The fact that the invasion was justified on 
grounds of affording protection to the Iraqis against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein 
was devastating to the R2P as it only served to increase the concerns of the smaller 
developing countries that it would be used to further erode their sovereignty.382 The 
reaction expressed by states revealed emphasis on traditional conceptions of non-
intervention instead of reducing sovereign prerogatives even for a humanitarian 
purpose.383
 The war in Iraq was an instrumental factor to the extensive debate that 
occurred in the 2005 UN World Summit with respect to the R2P doctrine. To a large 
extent, it is also responsible to the ‘salience’ in Darfur considering the global 
response to the situation where approximately 300,000 people have been killed and 
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1.7 million displaced since 2003.384 Although Darfur is a classic example of a 
government unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, it also shows an international 
community unwilling or unable to take on the responsibility that the R2P envisages as 
most states are keen to reaffirm the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and 
thus less willing than before to contemplate actions that violate this.385
4.4.3. The Responsibility to Protect, the High Level Panel Report and the UN 
Secretary General’s Response 
 
Notwithstanding the concerns and controversies surrounding the R2P norm after the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the doctrine continued to gain international political 
exposure.386 This development was mainly attributed to other factors such as the 
humanitarian situation in Darfur, which led non-governmental organisations to turn 
to the R2P framework as a basis for international action.387 In 2003, Kofi Annan who 
was Secretary General of the UN at the time commissioned the High Level Panel 
(HLP), which had the task of examining the challenges to international peace and 
security.388 The debate concerning the R2P then took a new turn in the HLP report 
where it was related to the institutional reform of the UN as the HLP saw the R2P 
doctrine as a means of strengthening the collective security system under the 
Charter.389
 The HLP agreed with the ICISS that there is an emerging norm of 
international responsibility to protect exercisable by the Security Council in the event 
of genocide, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which a state 
is unable or unwilling to prevent.
  
390
Whatever perceptions of sovereignty may have prevailed when 
the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of state 
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a 
 With respect to the issue of sovereignty, the HLP 
commented that:  
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state to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its 
obligation to the wider community.391
For the panel, sovereignty only attaches to a state as a means of ensuring the security 
of its citizens and where sovereignty is misused by a state’s failure to fulfil this 
responsibility, its sovereignty could be denied.
 
392 In attaching its definition of 
sovereignty to the Charter, and in positing for the responsibility of a state to protect 
its people, the HLP was adhering to the R2P doctrine as proposed by the ICISS.393
In general terms the HLP’s recommendations reflected those of the ICISS 
with respect to the precautionary principles except with the inclusion of ‘serious 
violations of humanitarian law’ to the list of actions under the just cause 
requirements.
  
394 However, the HLP differed from the ICISS by omitting any 
discussion of what should happen in the face of Security Council inaction or veto.395 
This was to enable it obtain consensus from those members of the panel who were 
most sensitive about eroding state sovereignty by expressly endorsing any unilateral 
right to intervene.396
These recommendations given by the HLP regarding the R2P doctrine were 
subsequently reflected in a report published by the former Secretary General of the 
UN, Kofi Annan, some months before the UN world summit in 2005.
 
397 He 
emphasised that the international community should ‘embrace the emerging doctrine 
of the R2P as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.’398 Just like the reports of the ICISS and HLP, the Secretary 
General recognised that the R2P lies primarily with each individual state but where 
the national authorities are unwilling or unable to, the responsibility shifts to the 
international community.399
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population’ and when this fails, the Security Council may take enforcement action in 
accordance with the UN Charter.400
It is worth noting that although the substance of the Secretary General’s report 
were similar to those of the ICISS and the HLP, the precautionary criteria put in place 
to guide military intervention were excluded in his comments on the R2P.
 
401 The R2P 
doctrine was removed from the section dealing with the use of force and placed in the 
section dealing with the freedom to live in dignity.402 This was to separate the idea of 
the R2P from an automatic equation to armed force.403 This was attributable to the 
fact that at the time of the Secretary General’s report, there was significant opposition 
against the R2P doctrine and most notably by permanent members of the Security 
Council.404 The emphasis by the Secretary on the need to implement the R2P through 
peaceful means thus helped influence the normative context of the doctrine and paved 
way for the consensus reached at the World summit.405
4.4.4. The Responsibility to Protect, the 2005 World Summit and the Outcome 
Document 
 
The most significant impact on the R2P doctrine was its inclusion into the agenda and 
outcome document of the 2005 UN world summit. Since the change in the language 
concerning humanitarian intervention had not generated a substantial consensus as 
had been expected - (a fact most attributed to the invasion in Iraq in 2003), the 
members of the ICISS lobbied hard to persuade states to adopt the R2P doctrine at the 
world summit.406 At the world summit, 191 Heads of State and Government sitting as 
the UN General Assembly deliberated upon the R2P.407 However, during negotiations 
at the summit, there was a mixed reaction amongst the states, which mirrored earlier 
concerns expressed towards the doctrine as postulated by the ICISS.408
 During the debate at the world summit, many states opposed the R2P as a 
vague concept requiring further explanation to show what differentiates it from 
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traditional humanitarian intervention.409 According to the Algerian representative, it 
was extremely difficult to differentiate the R2P particularly the responsibility to react 
from the idea of humanitarian intervention which the ‘countries from the south had 
formally rejected in 1999.’410 Generally, the states belonging to the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) severely criticised the R2P by excluding it as an emerging 
norm.411 The Malaysian representative speaking on behalf of the NAM argued that 
the R2P represented a ‘reincarnation’ of humanitarian intervention for which there 
was no basis in international law.412
 These states (NAM) emphasised that the R2P was a contradiction in the sense 
that on one hand it intended to reduce sovereignty in the name of universal 
humanitarian considerations and on the other hand it expanded sovereignty in the 
interventionist sense, thereby limiting the sovereignty of weaker states while 
reinforcing that of stronger states.
 
413 In particular, Venezuela argued that since the 
R2P was couched in a manner that allowed states the discretion to decide when to act, 
it would merely serve the interest of powerful   states by granting them more freedom 
to act in the affairs of weak states without necessarily increasing global response to 
humanitarian emergencies.414
 While majority of African states chose not to give individual opinions at the 
summit regarding the R2P, only South Africa publicly endorsed the concept with 
Algeria, Tanzania and Egypt openly opposing it.
  
415 On the part of the Group of 77, 
although they offered no joint position on the R2P doctrine, they however suggested 
that the doctrine be revised to emphasise the principles of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.416
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410 UN doc. A/59/PV.86 pg 9 cited in Focarelli (ibid). 
411Focarelli (note 324) at 7. 
412 Brown (note 302). 
413 Focarelli (note 324) at 7. 
414 Statement by Hugo Chavez President of Venezuela at the General debate of the 60th session on the 
UNGA cited in A Bellamy (note 286) at 147. 
415Bellamy (note 286) at 162. 












developing states.417 India argued that the Security Council was adequately 
empowered under the UN Charter to act in cases of humanitarian emergencies.418
The R2P was also unequivocally rejected by powerful international actors 
such as China.
  
419 In addition, the R2P significantly failed to find absolute support 
from even its supporters who apart from contesting its endorsement by existing 
international law also emphasised that the responsibility to react with military force 
was to be undertaken by the Security Council.420 Particularly, the Russian 
representative stated that although the UN Secretary General had referred to the R2P 
as a doctrine reflecting an emerging norm, “strictly speaking, the establishment of an 
international norm presupposes that there is wide support within the international 
community for such a norm. However, this is not the case here.”421
The position of the United States was reflected in a letter from the US 
Ambassador, John Bolton, to the UN while reacting to section of the R2P in the draft 
outcome document. He noted that although the international community had a role to 
play in cases involving genocide and other large-scale atrocities, the UN Charter had 
never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for members of the Security 
Council to support enforcement actions in cases involving serious breaches of 
international peace.
 
422 While recognising that a state has a responsibility to protect its 
population, he noted that the responsibility of the international community is not of 
the same character as the responsibility of the host state.423
Accordingly, he suggests that the idea of an international responsibility to 
protect be defined in the form of a moral responsibility.
 
424On the part of other 
members of the Security Council (with the exception of China and Russia), although 
in support of the R2P, they expressed concerns about committing to any criteria and 
were unwilling to give up the practice of case by case decision making about 
intervening for humanitarian or other reasons.425
                                                   
417MacFarlane et al (note 377) at 983. 
 The combined resistance of these 
418Brown (note 302). 
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states towards the R2P destroyed any attempt to develop any agreed guidelines at the 
summit.426
However, amidst a highly controversial and difficult negotiation, the Heads of 
State and Government were able to endorse a qualified R2P in the outcome document 
of the summit.
 
427 They affirmed that ‘each state had a responsibility to protect its 
population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity’ 
and that this responsibility entails the prevention and incitement of such crimes.428 
With reference to the responsibility of the international community, their 
responsibility was limited to encouraging and helping the victim state (in exercising 
its responsibilities) through the UN by diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.429 Nonetheless, should these 
peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities fail to protect their 
populations from those crimes, they expressed their preparedness to take collective 
action on a case-by-case basis through the Security Council in accordance with 
chapter VII of the Charter.430
The agreement reached at the summit is usually regarded as an important 
development to international law in the sense that it builds upon recent trends in 
international law and practice with respect to humanitarian intervention.
 
431 The 
inclusion of the R2P in the outcome document is said to undermine any objection that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention violates state sovereignty.432 The argument has it 
that if states have no sovereign right to commit or permit gross atrocities against their 
population, then they cannot object on grounds of sovereignty to any humanitarian 
intervention undertaken to stop the commission of those atrocities.433 This is because 
although the outcome document gave priority to a Security Council authorised action, 
it did not expressly rule out unilateral humanitarian interventions.434
                                                   
426Wheeler (note 371) at100. 
 
427 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope ‘Norms, Institutions and the UN Reform: The Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2005/2006) 2 Journal of International Law and International Relations 121 at 126. See also 
Dorr (note 345) pg 190. 
428 World Summit Outcome Document (note 151) at para 138. 
429 Ibid at para(s) 138 & 139. 
430 Ibid at para 139. 
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However, this interpretation of the outcome document does not seem to reflect 
the actual view of majority of governments who expressed concern regarding the 
effect of the doctrine on state sovereignty and insistence on prior Security Council 
authorisation of the use of force in order to prevent abuse of the R2P.435 In addition, 
the wordings of paragraph 139 of the outcome document instead of developing or 
acknowledging a new norm seems to suggest that the enforcement action in place 
under the Charter is adequate in dealing with issues of international peace and 
security.436
According to Alex Bellamy, in order to secure consensus, the advocates of the 
R2P abandoned many of its central tenets significantly reducing the likelihood of 
progress in future.
  
437For example, the document completely excluded the list of the 
precautionary principles earlier proposed by ICISS and HLP to guide military 
interventions.438 It fails to address the fundamental question of what should happen if 
the Security Council fails to authorise the use of force to prevent or end humanitarian 
crisis.439Another shortcoming is that apart from limiting the responsibility to respond 
with military force to international crimes, it also required not merely the threat of 
commission, but the actual commission of these crimes.440 Generally, the outcome 
document sought to raise the threshold for international action by changing the terms 
warranting collective action from ‘unable or unwilling to act’ to use the term 
‘manifest failure’.441
4.4.5. The Responsibility to Protect and Practice after the World Summit: Has a 
Norm Emerged? 
 
Although many point to the inclusion of the R2P doctrine in the outcome document 
as a positive normative development concerning sovereignty, in reality, the outcome 
document did nothing to change the political reality.442
                                                   
435Stahn (note 294) at 101. 
 One would have thought that 
its adoption showed a readiness of states and the international community as a whole 
to accept the R2P as a binding international norm. Practice however reveals 
436Bannon (note 431) at 1159. 
437Bellamy (note 286) at 146. 
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otherwise.443 This is not however surprising because unlike the other documents 
dealing with the R2P, the outcome document no longer refers to it as an ‘emerging 
norm’.444 In addition, paragraph 139 of the outcome document, which reflects the 
responsibility of the international community, implies a voluntary rather than an 
obligatory responsibility.445
 Given the possibility of the R2P to have a transformative impact on the 
traditional structure of state sovereignty, it is not surprising that although they agreed 
to its inclusion in the outcome document, many states have sought to limit the 
consequence of the R2P.
 As the states commit themselves to act only on a ‘case-
by-case basis’ through the Security Council, this rebuts any presumption of the 
universality of the R2P. 
446 Evidence shows that the East Asian states and regional 
organisations despite the R2P still cling firmly to the traditional principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.447 On the part of the African 
region, although the R2P remains in substance a significant idea of the AU and some 
of its sub-regional organisations, there has been a departure from its earlier 
commitment.448 This is obvious in the Darfur situation where if the R2P was fully 
implemented implies an obligation of Sudan to protect its population and answerable 
to other states when it fails to discharge that responsibility.449 On the contrary, the 
African states together with the Arab League have insisted that the ‘campaign of 
terror’ sponsored by the Khartoum government was if not strictly a domestic matter, 
then one which only Africans had the right to engage in with the consent of the 
state.450
 Furthermore, most states remain unconvinced about the legal status of the 
R2P.
  
451 This attitude was most notable in the actions of Latin American, African and 
Arab delegates to the UN Budget Committee in 2008.452
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General Assembly at the 2005 world summit had neither established nor adopted the 
R2P as a general principle of international law as paragraph 139 of the outcome 
document only charged the General Assembly to continue consideration of the R2P 
and its implications bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international 
law.453  In essence, their argument was that paragraphs 138 and 139 of the outcome 
document were just about the protection of civilians from specific crimes rather than 
an endorsement of the concept of the R2P.454 In addition, both the governments of the 
United States and the United Kingdom have chosen to frame the R2P in terms of a 
political and moral principle.455
 Since many states are unsure of the legal limits and practical consequences of 
the R2P, it will only become clearer through state practice which is at present 
relatively insufficient. 
 
456 This is because although the R2P has been dealt with in 
four documents which to an extent reflect opinio juris of states, these documents are 
however not binding and as such the intention of states will have to be confirmed 
through sufficient state practice to ground its validity in customary international 
law.457
So far the R2P has found its way in few Security Council Resolutions the first 
being resolution 1674 of April 26, which reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 
and 139 of the outcome document.
   
458 However, it should be noted that consensus was 
reached because the resolution specifically focused on the protection of civilian 
population in armed conflict and not in terms of humanitarian intervention.459 
Subsequent resolutions authorising military force in Sudan also made reference to the 
R2P.460
The Security Council while recalling its previous resolution 
1674 actually reaffirmed its strong commitment to the 
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of 
Sudan and expressed its determination to work with the 
  In this regard: 
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458 Resolution 1674 UN SCOR 5430th Meeting UN Doc S/RES1674 (2006). 
459 Focarelli (note 324) at 8. 












government of Sudan in full respect of its sovereignty to assist 
in tackling the various problems in Darfur.461
 As a result of these inconsistencies and ambiguities in the implementation of 
the R2P, the R2P should thus be regarded as ‘a political catchword that gained quick 
acceptance’ instead of as a legal norm.
 
462 The simple fact that the R2P was included 
in the outcome document does not prove the existence of a norm that has been 
genuinely accepted by states as having the capacity to influence state conduct with 




 From the foregoing, it appears that there is no international law norm of the 
responsibility to protect which redefines sovereignty from control to responsibility. 
While new concepts may explain new realities, it does not follow that they are able to 
create new legal norms.464 Although as noted by the ICISS that there has been a 
growing gap between the practice of international behaviour as articulated in the 
charter whose language emphasised sovereign equality and independence and actual 
state practice as evolved since the charter was signed which emphasises limits on 
sovereignty, states continue to hold on to absolute sovereignty (that is sovereignty as 
control).465
As it stands the R2P does not create a binding norm in favour of humanitarian 
intervention and consequently is unable to avoid future Kosovos and future 
Rwandas.
   
466 It therefore seems that that sovereignty as right (control) continues to 
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 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Sovereignty is a concept which has over the last 500 centuries come to dominate our 
understanding of international life.468 It is deeply rooted legally and institutionally in 
numerous regional and international arrangements.469 It has contributed to 
international justice even if modestly by acting as a normative barrier against the 
predatory instincts of the more powerful states.470 The Westphalian system (that is 
sovereignty as control) with its implied tenets of non-intervention and the prohibition 
on the use of force has provided a measure of stability, predictability and order 
within the anarchic system of states for centuries.471
 However, with the passage of time, especially within the past 50 years, the 
concept of sovereignty has been seriously challenged.
  
472 It is true that state 
sovereignty has always been limited in one way or the other albeit with its consent or 
acquiescence. Practice reveals the consistent violation of the principle of non-
intervention particularly in the face of gross human rights violations. Consequently, 
there have been various attempts by international law scholars to redefine the 
concept of sovereignty in order to bring it in line with practice by placing formal 
limitations on state sovereignty although the problem remains how to determine what 
new limits it has today. 473
These attempts at redefining sovereignty usually emphasise the need to create 
a balance between human rights norms and sovereignty.
 
474 This is so because 
international sensibilities regarding human rights and their violations have changed 
quite radically over the past 50 years and this reality can hardly be ignored.475
                                                   
468 Camilleri (note 44) at 33. 
 The 
most notable attempts to place formal limitations on sovereignty in the face of gross 
human rights violation has been the development of the norms of humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P. These norms propose that in certain circumstances, 
sovereignty as right gives way to sovereignty as responsibility, thereby creating a 
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necessary precondition for increased legitimisation of interventions even if the 
principle of non-intervention gets impaired in the process.476
However, in order for these norms to have the desired effect of overriding 
sovereignty as right, they must have attained the status of international law. As noted 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘the rules of law binding upon states 
emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law.’
 
477 As noted in Chapter Two, humanitarian 
intervention is regarded as intrusive and is generally criticised as not being part of 
international law.478
With respect to the R2P doctrine, although it has found its way into four 
documents, a closer examination of these documents shows considerable divergences 
in opinion and the outcome document which is arguably the most authoritative in 
terms of its legal value leaves considerable doubt concerning whether and to what 
extent states intended to create a legal norm.
  
479 Moreover, these documents are not 
legally binding as generating international law under the sources of international law 
envisaged in Article 38 of the statute of the ICJ.480 In addition, as seen from the 
previous chapter, there is actually no evidence of state practice concerning the R2P, 
as it has never been put into practice. On balance, most states and observers believe 
that it remains a political commitment.481
Although no state doubts that populations should be protected from gross 
violations of human rights committed by their governments, nor do they totally 
exclude further and constructive discussions regarding collective interventions in 
cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, it is the wish of 
most states that such deliberations must be consistent with the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.
  
482 Without support from states as a whole, an 
emerging norm can hardly emerge and credibly be binding upon them.483
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without sufficient state practice and opinio juris, restrictions upon the independence 
of states cannot be presumed.484
The failure of states to accept these norms as international law is basically 
because they have the potential of weakening the protections of territorial integrity 




The historical legacy of the development of the state system has 
left a powerful institutional structure in the form of sovereignty 
one that will not be easily dislodged, regardless of changed 
circumstances in the material environment.
  This in turn runs the risk of destabilising international order. 
According to Barkin and Cronin,  
486
Thus while it is true that sovereignty has undergone serious challenge, it is 
still taken to be the defining characteristic of states and of the international system 
and places constraints to the extent to which normative issues can be accommodated 
within international law.
   
487 This is because in practice, ‘there is almost always a 
yielding to sovereignty as a right in the endgame of real Realpolitik.’488 This is most 
notable by the fact that weak states continue to see the invocation of sovereignty in 
its absolute form as one of the few instruments still available to them to help 
discourage interventions by powerful states in their internal affairs.489 Conversely, 
powerful states particularly the US invoke sovereignty as a lever with which to 
impede the work of any multilateral institution bent on monitoring their activities or 
otherwise restricting their freedom of action.490
 However, as the ICISS rightly noted, the defence of sovereignty as a right or 
in its absolute form even by its strongest supporters does not include the claim of 
unlimited power of the state to treat its population as it pleases.
  
491
                                                   
484 The SS Lotus Case (note 477). 
 Nevertheless, as 
practice shows, many states still experience serious human right abuses and most 
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states acquiesce in the face of this without any weakening of their sovereignty or any 
lessening of the international recognition of their sovereignty.492
Although public opinion, and the often cited precedents of state practice with 
regards to the violation of the principle of non-intervention, seems to have extended 
tolerance of the international community for the erosion of sovereignty, there has 
been no general acceptance of a right of humanitarian intervention or the R2P as 
norms which override Westphalian sovereignty.
 
493 At present, the principles of 
sovereignty as control, non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force 
remain privileged above other principles of international law particularly those 
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